A6M "Zeros" - Radios or No Radios at Midway?

[Feldgrün]

I was searching for information regarding radios in Japanese A6M "Zeros" at the Battle of Midway, and came across this interesting website. As I read "Samurai" by Saburō Sakai, I was painfully reminded that the early A6Ms did not have radios. He notes in certain instances (before Guadalcanal) that he had no way to communicate to his fellow pilots when he recognized threats that they did not see.

The internet has mixed opinions on whether all of the A6Ms at Midway had radios. Some postulate that all A6Ms at Midway did have radios, but others that it was only flight leaders that had radios, etc. and that the lack of radios was one of the reasons for the Japanese loss.

[Amiral Crapaud]

Although the jury might still be somewhat out as far as the number of actual radios is concerned, one thing is still certain - considering there was no FDO doctrine really, having a radio in this case would amount to little in terms of overall efficiency. No RADAR & no TBS also means that any indication from the screen would have to be usually relayed (usually by light signals) to the carrier before it could be transmitted to any radio operator, a most inadequate technique that explains why the screen was instead instructed, from my understanding, to fire in the direction of the threats they'd spot, with larger guns if need be, so as to attract the attention of the fighter cover.

[CPT Crunch]

Your over rating the value of radios within the Japanese Command and Control system, they wouldn't have helped much.  Even when they did have them their faulty Bushido code made utility virtually useless in a tactical setting.  It was considered perfectly acceptable to not reply, even back to a major HQ, witness the battle for Leyte, two groups who refuse to communicate, one even refusing to keep Tokyo in the loop.  They excelled at defeating themselves even with radios.

[BlitzPig_EL]

Indeed.  Junior officers regularly countermanded orders from higher up their command chain if they felt they were not aggressive enough.

There are also examples where, especially in naval surface engagements, an admiral snatched defeat from the jaws of victory.  The inexplicable retreat of a superior Japanese surface force at the Battle off Samar is a prime example.